Denmark 2023<\/a><\/span>\n <\/h3>\n “Cyber operations may violate the prohibition on the threat or use of force, which primarily depends on the physical scale and effects of the cyber operation in question. It requires an individual assessment of the specific circumstances in each case to determine whether the scale and effects of a cyber operation correspond to what would qualify as use of force had they resulted from conventional weapons.\n <\/p>\n
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter sets out that all Member States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Numerous other international documents and State practice contribute to the understanding of the principle of the non-use of force. It is, however, fair to assert that there are still significant grey areas and divergent views among States as to the precise content of the law.\n <\/p>\n
Generally, Denmark subscribes to the notion that where a cyber operation results in injury, death, or significant physical damage, this prima facie qualifies as use of force.\n <\/p>\n
With regard to the precise interpretation of the term force and the question as to whether economic or political coercion can qualify as use of force, Denmark considers that it generally cannot be ruled out that acts of economic or political coercion can fall within the purview of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter if, for example, a cyber operation resulting in the malfunctioning of a State\u2019s financial system leads to significant economic damage.\n <\/p>\n
It has been suggested that States should apply the following non-exhaustive factors for determining if a cyber operation reaches the level of use of force: Severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability of effects, military character, State involvement, presumptive legality.[5] While few States in their public positions have endorsed these particular factors, Denmark is of the view that these factors are useful reference points for further understanding and discussing the definition of use of force in cyberspace.”[33]<\/a><\/sup>\n <\/p>\n <\/span>Estonia 2021<\/a><\/span>\n <\/h3>\n \n \n <\/caption>\n \n \n | States must refrain in their international relations from carrying out cyber operations which, based on their scale and effect, would constitute a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or a political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.<\/b>\n <\/td>\n <\/tr>\n <\/tbody>\n <\/table>\n “While taking measures in cyberspace, states must comply with the obligations and constraints enshrined in international law, including the UN Charter and customary international law. The threat or use of force in international relations is prohibited; however, the UN Charter foresees concrete situations where it could be allowed (in response to an armed attack, as self-defence or in accordance with chapter VII of the UN Charter).\n <\/p>\n The prohibition of the threat or use of force in cyberspace was also acknowledged and highlighted in the 2015 GGE report, endorsed by the UN General Assembly. Notably, the report states that \u201cin considering the application of international law to State use of ICTs, the GGE identified as of central importance the commitments of States to the following principles of the Charter and other international law [\u2026] refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State [\u2026].\u201d\n <\/p>\n A cyber operation that targets critical infrastructure and results in serious damage, injury or death, or a threat of such an operation, would be an example of use of force.”[34]<\/a><\/sup>\n <\/p>\n |